Why Did the Sheraton Move Happen? PH's Hidden War Before the Coup

The Sheraton Move did not start at the hotel's front door.

Before the doors even opened, the table was already shaking.

Not the table at the hotel.

But the table inside the Pakatan Harapan (PH) government.

Sitting around the same table were 92-year-old Mahathir and Anwar, who had waited over two decades; Bersatu, eager to secure rural Malay entry points, and DAP, whom the opposition routinely used to frighten Malay voters. ^1,2,3

They had won together in 2018.

But victory did not answer one question.

Who would conclude Mahathir's second term as Prime Minister?

An Undated Handover Agreement#

From the very beginning, PH's arrangement contained a fissure.

Mahathir would serve as Prime Minister first, and Anwar would take over later. But when was "later"? Two years? After APEC? Once reforms were complete? Once the Malay community felt secure? This date was never set in stone as an indisputable timeline. Subsequent ISEAS research referred to this as the unrealized Mahathir-Anwar transition. ^1,2

When a date is not written down, politics will write it for you.

Mahathir's camp could argue: the country just changed governments, old debts haven't been cleared, the economy needs stabilizing—we can't rush this.

Anwar's camp could ask: if a promise carries no date, how is it any different from procrastination?

Every time reporters asked about the transition, every time someone within the party spoke out, the government cracked a little more. ^1,2,4

The Anwar Faction and the Azmin Faction#

PKR itself was not a monolith.

Anwar was the party president and the presumptive "Prime Minister-in-waiting." Azmin Ali was the deputy president, controlled a network of MPs and states, and held a crucial economic portfolio in the PH cabinet. ISEAS research on the ruptures within PKR and PH point to the exit of the Azmin camp from PKR as a key step in the Sheraton crisis. ^1,2,5

This complicated the transition issue further.

If Anwar took over, what would happen to the Azmin camp's positions?

If Mahathir stayed on, how much longer would Anwar's supporters have to wait?

This was not simply a lingering grudge between two older men. It had morphed into a real-world competition over party personnel, ministerial positions, MP loyalty, and who would ultimately control the future Prime Minister's Office. ^1,2

So, PH looked like a single government on the outside.

Inside, however, were several governments-in-waiting.

Bersatu's Fear#

Bersatu's dilemma was more straightforward.

Within PH, it served a specific function: allowing Malay voters who refused to vote for DAP or PKR a path to leave Najib and UMNO. But once in power, issues like ICERD, the Rome Statute, Malay rights anxiety, and the opposition's mobilization meant Bersatu constantly feared being viewed by rural Malays as a minor party merely "holding the umbrella for DAP." ^1,2,3

For Bersatu, Mahathir remaining as Prime Minister was not just about an old man clinging to power.

It was their strongest card to prove they had not surrendered Malay political dominance. ^1,2

If Anwar took over, PH's center of gravity would lean further toward PKR and DAP. Could Bersatu still hold onto the Malay vote? This was the internal calculation Bersatu had to make. ^1,2

From this perspective, the Sheraton Move was not a sudden betrayal.

It was Bersatu's long-standing fear finally finding an outlet.

DAP's Predicament#

In this narrative, DAP is most easily cast in a simplistic role.

Supporters would say DAP swallowed its pride; for the sake of the first-ever regime change, it endured delays in reforms and bore the brunt of Malay political stigmatization.

Critics would say DAP was too afraid of the government falling, too willing to yield to the pacing of Mahathir and Bersatu, ultimately disappointing its own supporters and failing to secure the transition promise.

Both arguments have substance.

DAP knew full well it was the opposition's primary target when attacking PH. DAP ministers, particularly Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng, were frequently woven into the narrative of "Chinese controlling the government." This meant DAP constantly had to prove it was pushing for reform while simultaneously proving it was not "controlling" Mahathir's administration on various issues. ^1,2,3

Therefore, DAP's stance was often multi-layered.

Publicly, it had to preserve the PH government, refusing to let the opposition portray it as a destabilizing force.

Internally, it had to face questions from its grassroots: since we have changed the government, why must so many promises wait? ^1,3

The Night of February 21#

On February 21, 2020, the PH Presidential Council met to discuss the transition of power. Before the meeting, the public expected a definitive date for Mahathir to hand over power to Anwar; after the meeting, Mahathir announced that the Presidential Council had unanimously given him its full confidence to decide the exact time of the transition, only reiterating that it would be after the November APEC summit. There was no fixed date. ^2,4

This looked like a compromise.

It also looked like putting the bomb back in the drawer.

Anwar did not successfully force Mahathir's hand that night. Mahathir did not have a departure date written down. DAP and Amanah did not bring down the government. Bersatu did not get an answer completely excluding Anwar. ^1,2,4

No one lost, for the time being.

So everyone continued to be anxious.

February 23: The Hidden War Comes to Light#

Two days later, on February 23, the various camps began to maneuver openly.

Reports noted multiple political meetings occurring simultaneously; a group of MPs and leaders from both the ruling and opposition coalitions gathered at the Sheraton Hotel in Petaling Jaya. By February 24, Mahathir resigned, Bersatu left PH, the Azmin camp exited PKR, and the PH government lost its majority. ^1,2,5

In that moment, DAP's stance also began to shift.

Initially, DAP leaders still praised Mahathir for refusing to cooperate with UMNO and were prepared to back him to continue as Prime Minister in an emergency PH meeting, hoping to restore the original PH government. ^2,6

But the direction Mahathir proposed after his resignation was no longer just "a PH government led by Mahathir." He began discussing a "unity government" free from partisan ties. To DAP, this equated to stripping away the 2018 PH manifesto and coalition responsibilities, leaving only room for Mahathir's personal choice of ministers. ^2,7

So DAP turned around.

On February 26, PH announced the nomination of Anwar as its Prime Ministerial candidate; on February 27, Lim Guan Eng publicly stated that Mahathir refused to commit to fulfilling the PH election manifesto. ^2,7,8

Here you can see the good and the bad of DAP.

The good side is that it ultimately returned its stance to the coalition manifesto, party responsibility, and the Anwar handover promise, rather than accepting a Mahathir-led personal government unbound by PH's platform. ^3,7,8

The bad side is that this judgment came very late. Over 22 months, in order to protect the government, evade Malay political attacks, and accommodate Mahathir's pace, DAP had already made many supporters feel it was too tolerant and took too long to say "no." ^1,2,3

Sheraton Was Not Just One Door#

The Sheraton Move is often described as an overnight betrayal.

Telling it this way is dramatic.

But insufficient.

The real drama was that long before that night, every major force in PH was already guarding against its own allies: Mahathir guarding against Anwar moving too fast, Anwar guarding against Mahathir stalling, Azmin guarding against Anwar's succession, Bersatu guarding against DAP and PKR swallowing the Malay vote, and DAP guarding against the government falling while also guarding against reforms being dragged to death. ^1,2,3

They were all in the same boat.

Yet each held onto a different lifeboat.

Then, the lights went on at that hotel in Petaling Jaya.

On the next page, the doors open.