Has Anwar's Reform Fallen Short? Lynas, the UEC and Judicial Reform

The Anwar government opened some doors.

The diesel subsidy was one.

The Parliamentary Services Act was another.

But at several other doors, its hand reached the handle and then stopped.

Lynas: From Street Slogans to Licence Conditions#

The Lynas rare-earth plant is one of the sharpest thorns in PH supporters' memories.

While in opposition, many PH politicians stood with environmental protesters. Once in government, the question changed: close the plant, or allow it to continue under stricter conditions? ^1,2,5

In 2023, MOSTI announced the renewal of Lynas's licence, but stressed that after July no new radioactive waste could be produced in Malaysia and cracking and leaching operations had to move abroad. The government later allowed Lynas to continue importing and processing rare earths until March 2026, citing among other things the company's proposal to extract radioactive elements from the waste; environmental groups continued to criticise the decision as a retreat. ^5,9

By 2026, the Lynas licence was extended for another ten years to 2036, with conditions including a five-year review, waste management and no new permanent disposal facility. ^5,6

The government can say: this is not unconditional approval.

Critics can also say: it is still not the answer that street supporters once expected.

UEC: The Easiest Door to Turn into an Identity War#

UEC recognition is another door.

PH's 2018 manifesto promised to recognise the UEC as one qualification for entry into public universities and the public service, provided the SPM Bahasa Melayu requirement was met. After 2022, the Unity Government's political structure became more complex: it needed BN and East Malaysian partners while facing Malay-nationalist resistance to Chinese-education issues. ^1,2

In 2026, the UEC issue heated up again. Parliamentary records and public reports show that the debate centred on Bahasa Melayu, History, public-university admission and the position of the national language. Anwar said publicly that UEC recognition did not threaten the national language; but as of this writing, that door had still not become a fully clear, stable and nationally implemented arrangement. ^1,7,8

Supporters can say: Anwar was at least willing to put the issue back on the table.

Critics will ask: how many years has that table been set?

Judicial Reform: The One That Should Be Fastest, Yet Moves Slowest#

An Attorney General who also serves as Public Prosecutor is one of the oldest and most frequently criticised doors in Malaysia's system.

The Anwar government has advanced a constitutional amendment draft and Parliamentary Special Select Committee work to separate the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor functions. Yet as of August 2026, the separation was still incomplete; institutional design, appointment methods, tenure safeguards and parliamentary oversight remained contested. ^3,4

This might have been something that could proceed slowly.

The problem is that Zahid's DNAA made slow movement untenable.

When the Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO President received a DNAA in a major case and the case later went no further, supporters no longer heard "judicial reform takes time" as caution. They heard delay. ^3,4

Why Anwar Moves Slowly#

Those who defend Anwar have one practical argument.

The Unity Government is not a PH-only government. It must maintain a majority with PH, BN, GPS, GRS and other partners; every sensitive reform can make grassroots members or leaders on one side step back. ^1,2,3

This is not an excuse.

But it is a fact.

Diesel subsidies could move because fiscal pressure, smuggling and targeted assistance provided a policy rationale. UEC, Lynas and prosecutorial separation touch deeper questions of identity, the environment, justice and coalition interests. ^2,5,7,3

That is why the Anwar government's reform map is so uneven.

On fiscal policy, it dares to cut.

On institutions, it pushes slowly.

On identity issues, it takes a detour.

When allies' cases are involved, it damages its own credibility.

The next page asks a sharper question.

When reform meets an ally's case, how brightly will the lights be turned on; and after the lights come on, how many people will still be willing to look at the whole table?